Concept Assessment · Force Design

Ground Combat Element 2040

The U.S. Marine Corps’ Framework for Future Ground Forces

PublisherHQMC Plans, Policies & Operations
ReleasedAugust 2026 (FY26 framework)
TypeForce design concept · unclassified
CategoryDoctrine · Force Design
Best ForForce developers & experimentation planners
Related EffortForce Design (formerly Force Design 2030)

This assessment steps outside the site’s usual book reviews to examine a document that will shape the next fifteen years of American ground combat: the U.S. Marine Corps’ Ground Combat Element (GCE) 2040 framework, released in its FY2026 form in August 2026. Nested under the Marine Corps’ Force Design initiative — the effort formerly known as Force Design 2030 — GCE 2040 moves the ground combat element from an initial baseline vision to actionable modernization priorities. For anyone in the capability development and experimentation business, it is required reading, and a useful mirror against the Army’s own transformation.

The framing problem is stated plainly: how to build ground combat formations that can dominate peer-level combat through 2040 in an environment of ubiquitous sensors, artificial intelligence, and networked long-range fires — while remaining able to fight when those same technological advantages are degraded or denied. That last clause is the intellectually honest heart of the document. It is easy to design a force for the network you hope to have; it is much harder to design one that still wins when the electromagnetic spectrum is contested and the data links are down. GCE 2040 at least asks the harder question.

The framework organizes transformation around five interconnected pillars, the first of which is the one worth dwelling on: Human-Centered Warfighting. The Marines have chosen to make the individual Marine, not the machine, the central design reference — “equipping the Marine, not the machine,” as the rollout put it. In an era of breathless enthusiasm for autonomy and AI, a service placing training, education, and ethos at the top of its modernization pillars is making a deliberate and, in this reviewer’s judgment, correct bet: technology enables the force, but willpower, discipline, and adaptability remain the decisive variables. This is the same conviction that runs through the leader development and experimentation work this firm practices — capability is ultimately a human achievement.

The document lays out a phased path — near-term (2026–2030), mid-term (2031–2035), and long-range (2036–2040) — with the far horizon envisioning formations transformed by AI-enabled command and control, widespread human-machine teaming, and resilient, dispersed operations built around the Marine division. The capability demands it generates are substantial: modular task organization, multi-domain lethality and targeting, littoral mobility platforms such as the ACV, ARV, and the Navy’s Landing Ship-Medium, CJADC2 integration, and crewed-and-uncrewed contested-logistics platforms. For the experimentation community, each of those is a line of effort demanding rigorous, iterative testing before it becomes a program of record — precisely the kind of work that separates aspiration from fielded capability.

The framework is not without its critics, and an honest assessment must note them. GCE 2040 inherits the controversy of Force Design itself: the divestment of tanks, cannon artillery, and bridging under Force Design 2030 remains contested among Marines who argue the Corps traded away combined-arms capability it will need in any fight that is not a Pacific island campaign. A concept framework cannot resolve that debate, and GCE 2040 largely restates the Force Design bet rather than re-examining it. Readers should weigh the document as a statement of institutional direction, not as a settled analytic case — and watch whether the experimentation to come validates or challenges its assumptions.

In summary, GCE 2040 is a serious, human-centric framework for Marine ground combat transformation, and its central instinct — that the Marine, not the machine, is the decisive element — is exactly right. Its ultimate soundness will be determined not by the elegance of the concept but by the rigor of the experimentation that follows it. For force developers in any service, it is both a useful benchmark and a reminder that the hardest transformation problem is not acquiring new technology, but designing a force that still wins when that technology fails.

About the reviewer — Colonel (Retired) Chris Willis is the founder of Willis Strategy Group, a Columbus, Georgia consulting firm focused on leader development, experimentation and modeling & simulation, and management consulting. A 1991 West Point graduate, he served 25 years as an Army Infantry officer and 10 years as a Department of the Army Civilian, including as Director of the Maneuver Battle Lab. Get in touch.