The Italian Campaign of 1943 and 1944 was the logical next step in the Allies’ plan to attack the ‘soft underbelly’ of the European Axis Powers following the success of Operation Torch in North Africa. It would serve as an economy of force campaign that could knock Italy out of the war and fix several German divisions (thus keeping them out of both France and Eastern Europe), all while buying time for the Allies to prepare for the invasion of France during Operation Overlord. In The Savage Storm: The Battle for Italy 1943, author James Holland argues that a lack of resources, an underestimate of Axis strategy, and highly defensible terrain all combine to turn the Italian Campaign into an infantry centric slog with some of the highest casualty rates of World War Two.
Holland is an English historian, prolific author, broadcaster, and podcaster (We Have Ways of Making You Talk). The Savage Storm is the second of Holland’s three books about the Allied Italian Campaign. His accompanying books are Sicily ’43: The First Assault on Fortress Europe (2021) and Cassino ’44: The Brutal Battle for Rome (2024). Although a healthy 624 pages, The Savage Storm provides the modern military leader with some timeless lessons about the complexity of combined and joint operations, the impact on infantry operations when close air support (CAS) is not available, and the requirement to set conditions during amphibious operations.
Picking up where Sicily ’43 left off, the Allied victory on Sicily, The Savage Storm begins with the invasion of Southern Italy in September 1943. The mainland Italian Campaign began on 09 September with the U.S. Fifth Army’s Operation Avalanche at Salerno on the southwest coast. Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army was a true combined force that included the U.S. VI Corps, the British X Corps, and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. Clark was a master organizer who had planned the first U.S./U.K. combined campaign, Operation Torch in North Africa in the summer of 1943. Clark was instrumental in planning the complex Torch, which included the simultaneous arrival of three landing forces from three different points of origin to include one from the Continental U.S.
However, Clark underestimated the threat of the defending Germans in the campaign to capture Naples. The low casualty rates during the landings in both North Africa and Sicily led Clark to underestimate the German opposition at Salerno and his subsequent attempts to establish a lodgment in southern Italy. However, the Allies were not facing half-hearted Vichy French or Italians as they had in North Africa and Sicily, respectively. This was compounded by southern Italy Army Group Commander Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s decision to fight for every inch of Italian soil instead of retreating and defending closer to Rome as Clark had estimated.
Clark’s landings were significantly handicapped by his decision to not suppress the enemy positions with aerial bombardment or naval gunfire in the hopes of retaining the element of surprise, which he was unsuccessful in doing. This, compounded by the relatively small assault landing force of only two infantry divisions, meant that the German 10th Army Group nearly pushed 5th Army back into the sea during the closely run days of 12-14 September. The high quantity and accuracy of Allied naval gunfire, Clark’s personal leadership, and reinforcement by the recently dropped 82nd Airborne Division, allowed the 5th Army to beat off the German counterattack and ultimately link up with Bernard Montgomery’s British Eighth Army. Naples and the rest of southern Italy were in Allied hands by early October.
Holland’s meticulously researched work results in a narrative that seamlessly ties the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. He uses vignettes from the small unit level, such as the actions of the US 3rd Infantry Division hero Audie Murphy, all the way up to the strategic thinking of British Field Marshal Harold Alexander to give the reader a true feel for all levels of the early Italian Campaign. Holland also pays equal attention to the struggles of the air, land, and naval forces of the US and UK, as well as those of the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe.
In summary, James Holland’s The Savage Storm is a worthy continuation of his look at the Allies’ campaign to attack the ‘soft underbelly’ of the Axis Powers. Holland’s expertise in WWII history, detailed first person narratives, and engaging narrative style make for an excellent book that memorializes a true turning point in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) of WWII. This book also provides pertinent lessons for the modern student of large-scale ground combat operations (LSCO).